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From Manufacturing to Design:  
An Essay on the Work of Kim B. Clark 
 
Sylvain Lenfle and Carliss Y. Baldwin 
 
Abstract 
 
Kim Clark occupies a unique place in management scholarship. As a member of the Technology 
and Operations Management unit of Harvard Business School, he participated in several major research 
initiatives during the 1980s and early 1990s, before becoming Dean of the School in 1995. And even as 
Dean, he continued to pursue research until 2005, when he left Harvard to become President of Brigham 
Young University—Idaho. In this paper, we describe Clark’s research and discuss his contributions to 
management and economics. We look at three distinct bodies of work. In the first, Clark (in conjunction 
with Robert Hayes and Steven Wheelwright) argued that the abandonment by U.S. managers of 
manufacturing as a strategic function exposed U.S. companies to Japanese competition. In the second 
research stream, conducted with Wheelwright, Bruce Chew, Takahiro Fujimoto, Kent Bowen and Marco 
Iansiti, Clark made the case that product development could be managed in new ways that would lead to 
significant competitive advantage for firms. Finally, in work conducted with Abernathy, Rebecca 
Henderson and Carliss Baldwin, Clark placed product and process designs at the center of his explanation of 
how innovation determines the structure and evolution of industries. 
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1. Introduction  
 
Kim Bryce Clark, a labor economist educated at Harvard University, joined the Harvard Business 
School faculty in the Production and Operations Management (POM) area in 1978. Shortly thereafter he 
began collaborations with colleagues William J. Abernathy, Robert H. Hayes and Steven Wheelwright.1 
These associations were to have a profound effect on the direction of Clark’s work, which up to that time 
had focused on the determinants of structural unemployment (Clark and Summers, 1982) and the impact 
of unionization on productivity (Clark, 1980a & b; 1984). Clark was active as a researcher at Harvard 
Business School from 1978 to 1995, when he became Dean of the School. Even then, he continued to 
pursue research until 2005, when he left Harvard to become President of Brigham Young University— 
Idaho.  
Early in his career, Clark came to believe that management plays a fundamental role in 
companies’ performance and therefore in the economy. This conviction would guide all of his subsequent 
research: it also explains why he was drawn to senior management roles, first as dean of a business 
school and then as president of a university.  
In this paper, we describe Clark’s research and discuss his contributions to management 
scholarship and economics. We look at three distinct bodies of work. In the first, Clark (in conjunction 
with Robert Hayes and Steven Wheelwright) argued that the abandonment by U.S. managers of 
manufacturing as a strategic function exposed U.S. companies to Japanese competition in terms of the cost 
and quality of goods. In the second, conducted with Wheelwright, Bruce Chew, Takahiro Fujimoto, Kent 
Bowen and Marco Iansiti, Clark made the case that product development could be managed in new ways 
that would lead to significant competitive advantage for firms. Finally, in work conducted with 
Abernathy, Rebecca Henderson and Carliss Baldwin, Clark placed product and process designs at the center 
of his explanation of how innovation determines the structure and evolution of industries. 
Clark’s work occupies a unique place in management scholarship for three reasons. First, he 
tended to focus on little known and under-appreciated management groups: manufacturing managers, 
product development managers, and product and process architects. Thus he intentionally positioned 
                                                           
1 From the mid 1980s, the group was called “Technology and Operations Management” (TOM) which, as we shall 
see, was emblematic of the evolution of the group’s research agenda. 
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himself outside the “traditional” management disciplines of strategy, finance, marketing and 
organizational behavior. Second, Clark swam against prevailing methodological currents by relying 
heavily on comparative and longitudinal field studies. As was the tradition at Harvard Business School, he 
observed practice in detail before trying to build theory or design empirical studies. His work on the 
automobile industry (Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow, 1983; Clark, Chew and Fujimoto, 1987; Clark and 
Fujimoto, 1991) is an example of what can be gained from this deeply grounded approach. Third, Clark 
looked beyond the boundaries of his own field to design theory, the engineering sciences, and finance for 
frameworks that would help him address the questions he sought to answer. As time went on, his 
theories became increasingly broad-based and inter-disciplinary. His crossing of disciplinary boundaries 
may explain why Clark’s work is usually not included in collections of works by leading scholars in the 
fields of management and organization theory. 
This paper is organized as follows. Section 2 describes Clark’s work with Hayes and 
Wheelwright on manufacturing. Section 3 describes his seminal work on new product development. 
Section 4 considers early work with Abernathy on innovation and industry evolution and the 
development of the ideas leading up to the breakthrough article (with Rebecca Henderson) on 
architectural innovation and the failure of established firms (Henderson and Clark, 1990). Section 5 looks 
at his work (with Carliss Baldwin) on design structure, dynamics, and value, and on the power of 
modularity to change industry structure. Section 6 describes later works that build on this theory of 
design. Section 7 concludes by looking at the convictions that guided Clark throughout his career and 
assessing his intellectual legacy. 
The references in this paper are divided into two sections. The first contains a chronological list of 
Clark’s publications. The second contains all other references in standard alphabetical order. 
2.  Surviving Japanese Competition: The Importance of 
Manufacturing 
 
The latter part of the 1970s was marked by a sharp increase in the U.S. trade deficit, particularly 
with Japan. U.S. companies, which had dominated world trade since the end of World War II, were 
increasingly faced with competition from Japanese firms, especially in symbolic markets such as autos, 
steel and semiconductors (Table 1). Moreover, government statistics pointed to a significant slowdown in 
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U.S. productivity growth compared with that of other developed countries. 
 
Table 1 : Changes in world market share of U.S. companies by major industry 1960-1986 
 
Industry % 
Iron and steel - 58  
Electrical equipments and electronics - 47 
Chemicals - 38 
Autos and trucks - 33 
Computers and office equipment -11 
 
Source : Chandler (1994), quoted in Baldwin and Clark (1994) 
 
This was a sudden reversal for the United States. After World War II, the Japanese and European 
economies were rebuilt with the help of U.S. companies and capital. And during the 25 years following 
the war, U.S. companies had served as a management model for companies around the world (Servan-
Schreiber, 1967; U.S. edition 1979). Today, however, Japan is the destination of choice for studies of 
manufacturing productivity. And in the 1970s, it became abundantly clear that many Japanese firms were 
superior to their American and European counterparts in terms of cost, product quality and even 
innovation.  
A heated debate arose in the U.S. over the reasons for the productivity growth slowdown and 
loss of competitiveness. One side argued that these trends were caused by macroeconomic factors, 
specifically insufficient savings by U.S. citizens, which, it was said, led to a high cost of capital and low 
rates of investment by U.S. companies. Behind this argument lurked the economic theory of comparative 
advantage, which holds that a country with lower factor costs (eg, cheap labor or a low cost of capital) 
will dominate in industries with low transportation costs. But comparative advantage did not explain 
why U.S. firms often lagged behind their Japanese counterparts, not just in cost, but also in product 
quality, reliability and innovation. And it did not explain why some U.S. companies in embattled 
industries like autos and steel were prospering even though they were subject to the same 
macroeconomic conditions as the companies in decline (Hayes and Abernathy, 1980).  
The other side argued for a microeconomic explanation. Those in this camp asserted that poor 
performance was the result of short-sighted decision-making on the part of U.S. managers. Two 
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prominent advocates of the microeconomic point of view were Clark’s senior colleagues Hayes and 
Abernathy. In a hard-hitting article, “Managing Our Way to Economic Decline,” published in the Harvard 
Business Review in 1980, they argued that American companies were suffering from “competitive myopia” 
and “listlessness.” 
By their preference for servicing existing markets rather than creating new ones and by their 
devotion to short-term returns and “management by the numbers,” many [managers] have 
effectively foresworn long-term technological superiority as a competitive weapon. In 
consequence they have abdicated their strategic responsibilities. (Hayes and Abernathy, 1980, p. 
70.) 
 
Clark, who had researched the productivity of cement plants in his doctoral dissertation, was soon drawn 
into the microeconomic camp.2  
Because of the ongoing debate over competitiveness, the question “how do Japanese firms 
compete?” was at the center of research in the POM group at Harvard Business School in the early 1980s. 
The group, led by William Abernathy and Robert Hayes, initially focused on the impact of manufacturing 
management on the comparative performance of U.S. and Japanese firms. It was evident that the methods 
Japanese companies used to manage their manufacturing operations differed significantly from U.S. 
practices and were a mainstay of their competitiveness (Hayes, 1981). However, manufacturing 
management had fallen out of favor in U.S. companies. Most managers and academics believed, to quote 
John Kenneth Galbraith (1958), that companies had “solved the problem of production.” Indeed 
Harvard’s POM group was one of the few academic departments in the country that saw manufacturing 
as a worthy subject of research.  
Wickham Skinner, a senior member of POM, had long argued that manufacturing was “the 
missing link” in corporate strategy (Skinner, 1969). And in the early 70’s, members of the group 
conducted a number of case studies of manufacturing performance across a wide range of industries. 
(These cases formed the curriculum of the Manufacturing Policy course in the early 1970s.) Their field 
research led several members of the group to become vocal critics of “scientific management,” a set of 
ideas put forward by Frederick Taylor in the early twentieth century, which were still very influential in 
the 1970s. (On Taylor’s views, see Hatchuel, 1994.) In contrast to Taylor’s static optimization approach, 
the POM faculty as a group were moving toward a dynamic, learning-oriented view of manufacturing, a 
                                                           
2 This research showed how changes in labor cost due to unionization forced management to change its methods and 
processes. It already underscored the link between productivity and management (Clark, 1980a & b; 1984). 
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view that emphasized the crucial role of problem solving in determining performance (Hayes and 
Wheelwright, 1984; Wheelwright and Hayes, 1985; Bohn and Jaikumar, 1986).  
Beginning in 1978, Kim Clark joined Hayes and Wheelwright in a series of research projects 
aimed at developing this new view of manufacturing. Their collaboration culminated in the book, 
Dynamic Manufacturing, published in 1988.  
Before we discuss this book, we should describe the research methodology that members of the 
POM group saw as distinguishing their work. The methods were rooted in the field research traditions of 
Harvard Business School. They were: 
• Longitudinal studies of specific plants, to acquire a clear understanding of how the 
organization operated and how its operations changed over time;  
• Comparative analyses of several plants making similar products and using the same type of 
process, to determine how practice varied across sites. 
 
These methods were applied, not only by Clark, Hayes and Wheelwright and by Clark’s students, Bruce 
Chew and Takahiro Fujimoto, but by others in the group including Ramachandran Jaikumar, Roger Bohn 
and David Garvin. The methodology came to be emblematic of the POM (later TOM) group’s approach to 
empirical research. 
Clark augmented these field research methods with a toolkit from economics. For example, a key 
problem in manufacturing research was to assess the performance of a given plant. Rather than 
employing traditional physical productivity indicators, which they considered too simplistic,3 Hayes and 
Clark (1985a & b; 1986)  introduced a concept from economics, Total Factor Productivity (TFP). TFP 
metrics compared a plant’s total production against a weighted average of all factors of production 
(capital, labor, materials and energy).4  
The use of this tool led to remarkable results. First, plants considered efficient based on 
traditional metrics turned out not to be efficient when measured by TFP. Second, application of TFP to 
different plants belonging to the same company revealed significant disparities in performance despite 
the fact that the products manufactured, the processes used, and the accounting systems were the same.  
To understand the reasons for these differences, Hayes, Wheelwright and Clark undertook an 
extensive study of 12 plants from a number of industrial sectors in different countries. The results, 
                                                           
3 Pre-existing measures focused on labor productivity, at a time when labor inputs were diminishing in many sectors. 
4 For the TFP calculation method, see Hayes and Clark, 1986, or Hayes, Wheelwright and Clark, 1988, p. 144 et seq. 
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synthesized Dynamic Manufacturing (1988), demonstrated the superiority of Japanese management 
methods.5 The most efficient plants were those that applied the following Japanese principles (then seen 
as revolutionary by many American managers):  
• Downstream production planning based on a just-in-time approach guided by customer 
demand. 
• Elimination of inventories perceived as a sign of production system failure. 
• Elimination of defects and faults through the implementation of a total quality process and 
preventive maintenance aimed at precluding their occurrence. 
• Organization of employees into autonomous teams responsible for managing and improving 
the overall production system. 
• Ongoing assessment of cost, quality and delivery time standards to ensure continuous 
process improvement (Kaizen). 
• Collaboration with suppliers to this same end. 
• Priority given to long-term performance, even if it reduced short-term productivity. 
 
Dynamic Manufacturing directly challenged Taylor’s principles of scientific management. U.S. 
companies had relied on Taylor’s ideas since the advent of mass production in the early twentieth 
century. But, according to Hayes, Wheelwright and Clark, Taylor’s methods led to a production system 
frozen in time. Japanese methods, in contrast, relied on learning capacity and collaboration to attain 
continuous improvement of the process. Japanese companies were able to improve productivity by 
identifying problems, experimenting with new solutions, and applying the solutions quickly to their 
production lines. Hence there was a “new paradigm”  in manufacturing:  
“continual learning” … emphasizes problem-solving at all levels, is cross-functional, combines 
top-down and bottom-up approaches, and violates most of Taylor’s assumptions about human 
behavior and motivation” (Hayes, Wheelwright and Clark, 1988, p. 250). 
 
Table 2, adapted from Dynamic Manufacturing, summarizes the key differences between the old and new 
manufacturing paradigms. 
                                                           
5 It is striking to note the evolution of issues from Hayes and Wheelwright’s earlier book, Restoring Our Competitive 
Edge (Hayes and Wheelwright, 1984) to Dynamic Manufacturing. The former book dealt mainly with structural 
decisions, typically capital investments. However two chapters were devoted to the German and Japanese 
approaches to manufacturing. In effect, Hayes and Wheelwright challenged the primacy of U.S. manufacturing 
methods by  describing the nature and performance of alternative models.  
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Table 2 : Old and new manufacturing paradigms 
 Command and Control 
[Taylor] 
Continual Improvement 
[Japanese] 
Assumptions underlying the 
manufacturing architecture 
Optimized defined tasks 
Productivity : adherence to best practice 
Decisions deferred to higher levels 
Narrow job definitions 
Staff over line 
Improve evolving tasks 
Productivity : develop better practices 
Decisions pushed down to lower levels 
Broad job definitions 
Line over staff 
Role of the work force 
Physical efforts 
Minimize skills (deskill) 
 
Process should be worker independent 
 
Maintain process stability (changes 
made only by staff groups) 
Mental efforts 
Maximize worker’s skill (both technical 
and problem solving 
Worker can add value to the process by 
improving it 
Process improvement is everybody’s job 
(many made by workers) 
Information needs 
Coordination (what and when) 
 
Fixed responses to problems through 
standard operating procedures 
Performance evaluation based on 
adherence to procedures 
Problem-solving (cause-effect and 
problem elimination) 
Flexible responses to problems as they 
arise 
Performance evaluation based on success 
of the business 
Management control 
Direct control (variance analysis, direct 
supervision, and inflexible procedures) 
 
Boss knows the answer 
Strict hierarchy and status 
Second-order (systems and procedures) 
and third-order (norms and values) 
control 
Boss supports and helps 
Peers working as a team 
 
Source : Hayes, Wheelwright and Clark, 1988, p. 251 
 
All in all, Dynamic Manufacturing made three important points. First, as we said, it argued that the 
principles governing competitiveness in manufacturing had changed, and thus paved the way for further 
research on the subject (notably Womack, Jones and Roos,  1991, discussed below). Second, it observed 
that the common denominator among the most efficient plants was learning capacity. Third, it strongly 
argued that management was what made the development of learning capacity possible. In other words, 
learning capacity arose, not because of a nation’s culture or workers’ attitudes, but because of the way 
work was organized and performance was measured and rewarded. 
The last two chapters of the book looked ahead to future research. The authors’ field studies of 
manufacturing plants highlighted the critical importance of product and process designs, which were 
developed prior to the start of production itself. Specifically, the field research revealed that changes in 
product or process designs after a new product was launched had dramatic, negative effects on 
manufacturing performance. Such changes were highly disruptive, especially because in most cases 
managers simply allowed them to happen. Dynamic Manufacturing thus pointed to the importance of 
activities that preceded production, thus contributing to a new area of study: product development.  
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3. The strategic role of new product development 
 
New product development became an important focus of Kim Clark’s research in the mid-1980s. 
The shift in focus was not an accident: Clark and his colleagues believed that innovation would be the next 
battlefield of international competition, and as field researchers, they wanted to be where the action was. 
The Dean of Harvard Business School, John McArthur, agreed. With his consent, Production and 
Operation Management (POM) was renamed Technology and Operation Management (TOM) in 1986 to 
symbolize the group’s new direction.  
Within the TOM group, Clark elected to focus on new product development, a field which was 
largely unexplored at the time.6 Working with his colleague and friend, Steve Wheelwright, and with 
doctoral students, Bruce Chew and Takahiro Fujimoto, Clark helped open up this new area of research. In 
particular, he and his coauthors were among the pioneers in: (1) understanding product development as 
an information processing and problem solving process; and (2) theorizing about the organizational 
structures suited to the management of such processes. 
 
3.1 Product Development in the World Auto Industry—The Pioneering Study  
 
Clark and his colleagues began in an industry Clark knew well, whose products he loved: 
automobiles. In their first study, Clark, together with students Bruce Chew and Takahiro Fujimoto, 
analyzed 29 product development projects for new vehicles. This was a comprehensive, global study 
involving 20 U.S., Japanese and European automobile manufacturers. The team used quantitative data 
plus interviews with participants to obtain a detailed picture of how the projects were carried out. Their 
findings were published in the Brookings Papers on Economic Activity in 1987 (Clark, Chew and Fujimoto, 
1987).  
This paper showed that, in addition to manufacturing advantages, Japanese auto companies also 
had a substantial edge in new product development. Japanese firms brought new products to market 
more quickly, consumed fewer resources, and delivered higher quality designs. Their high level of 
performance in product development in turn allowed Japanese companies to: 
                                                           
6 Other early entrants to the field were Kenochi Imaï, Ikujioro Nonaka and Hirotaka Takeuchi (Imai, Nonaka and 
Takeuchi, 1985; Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1986). The first of these articles was presented at a symposium organized by 
Clark and his colleagues at Harvard Business School in 1984. Contributions to the symposium were collected in The 
Uneasy Alliance (Clark, Hayes and Lorenz, 1985). 
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• Reduce design costs; 
• Offer a wider variety of products; 
• Quickly update the product line to respond to changes in demand; 
• Provide improved customer satisfaction thanks to the quality of the products offered. 
 
These findings met with a considerable response from researchers and auto executives alike. 
They became a key part of the argument set forth in the influential book, The Machine that Changed the 
World, which coined the phrase “lean production” to explain the competitive superiority of Japanese 
automakers (Womack, Jones and Roos, 1991). Indeed Chapter 5 of Machine was largely a summary and 
interpretation of the “Clark team’s” work.7 The key table from that chapter, summarizing their most 
important findings, is reproduced below. (See Table 3.8) 
The 1987 study was followed by two books: Product Development Performance (1991, with Takahiro 
Fujimoto) and Revolutionizing Product Development (1992, with Steven Wheelwright). Both books relied on 
field research within firms, including interviews, observation of problem solving processes, and 
involvement in project teams. Clark and Fujimoto focused exclusively on the automotive industry, while 
Wheelwright and Clark explored other sectors, especially medicine and electronics. These books were 
fundamental contributions to our modern understanding of how to manage new product development. 
We discuss them in detail in the next two sections. 
                                                           
7 Womack, Jones and Roos (1991), Chapter 5 and endnotes. 
8 For an update of this data showing the US catch-up in the 1990’s see Ellison et. al. (1995) and Fujimoto (1999). 
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Table 3 : Product development performance by regional auto industries, mid–1980s 
  
 Japanese 
producers 
American 
producers 
European 
Volume 
Producers 
European 
Specialist 
Producers 
Average Engineering Hours per new 
Car (millions) 1.7 3.1 2.9 3,1 
Average Development Time per New 
Car (in Months) 46.2 60.4 57.3 59,9 
Number of Employees in Project Team 485 903 904 
Number of Body per New Car 2.3 1.7 2.7 1,3 
Average Ratio of Shared Parts 18% 38% 28% 30% 
Supplier Share of Engineering 51% 14% 37% 32% 
Engineering Change Costs as Share of 
Total Die Cots 10-20% 30-50% 10-30% 
Ratio of Delayed Products 1 in 6 1 in 2 1 in 3 
Die Development Time (months) 13.8 25 28 
Prototype Lead Time (months) 6.2 12.4 10.9 
Time from Production Start to First 
Sale (months) 1 4 2 
Return to Normal Productivity after 
New Model (months) 4 5 12 
Return to Normal Quality after New 
Model (months) 1.4 11 12 
 
Source : Clark Chew and Fujimoto (1987) and Fujimoto (1989); summarized in Womack, Jones and Roos 
(1991, p. 118) 
  
3.2 Product Development Performance 
 
Product Development Performance became one of Clark’s most influential and widely cited works. 
Clark and Fujimoto started with the performance data, described above, that showed the superiority of 
Japanese firms. They went on to present a detailed comparative analysis of product development 
practices at automakers around the world. 
Conceptually, the authors regarded new product development as a set of information processing 
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and problem solving activities.9 The intermediate outputs of the process were information assets, in particular, 
product-specific knowledge and product and process designs.10 The aim of the overall process was to 
ensure the product’s integrity, i.e. its intrinsic qualities and its ability to meet the customer’s expectations. 
For a complex product like an automobile, the greatest management challenge was to establish 
organizational structures and practices that ensured adequate integration of diverse skills and knowledge, 
including the customers’ knowledge about what it was like to use the product (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991, 
Chapter 2).  
The book brought into focus three important new management ideas: (1) heavyweight product 
managers; (2) overlapping problem-solving cycles (also called concurrent engineering); and (3) the 
integration of customers and suppliers into product development activities. Clark and Fujimoto were not 
the only academics to elucidate these concepts, but their analysis was backed up by extraordinary 
amounts of field data, hence their arguments carried great weight.  
Heavyweight product managers: “To the extent that product performance is more than just the 
sum of component performance or technical specifications,” Clark and Fujimoto argued, “firms need to 
worry about integrity and thus integration” (p. 250). They defined two types of integration: (1) internal 
integration, which aimed to coordinate the various groups within a company; and (2) external integration, 
which aimed to coordinate the company with customers and suppliers. Clark and Fujimoto observed 
that, in their sample, the highest levels of external and internal integration were achieved (by Japanese 
firms) through having a “heavyweight product manager.” This manager was committed to the project 
through its entirety; was empowered to make key decisions; and had the status, experience and resources 
to exert influence on both team members and senior managers.11 At least in the auto industry, 
heavyweight project managers were a pre-requisite to success in product development. In other words, 
                                                           
9 Clark and Fujimoto cited Marquis (1978), Allen (1977), Freeman (1982), Galbraith (1973), Tushman and Nadler 
(1978), Kotler (1988), Engel, Blackwell and Kollat (1987) and Bettman (1979), Weick (1979) and Nonaka (1988) as 
sources of the “information paradigm” used in the book (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991, Chapter 1, notes 2 and 9). This 
perspective opened new territories for research on new product development (see the surveys by Brown and 
Eisenhardt, 1995 and Krishnan and Ulrich, 2001). Interestingly, Clark and Fujimoto did not mention design theorists 
like Alexander (1964), Simon (1969) and Marple (1961), although Clark was aware of their work and cited them in 
other writings (discussed below). Though Clark was active in several fields at once, he maintained intellectual 
divisions between different strands of work. His work on product development was managerial, thus he sought to 
connect it with the prior management literature, not with design theory. He was eclectic, but only to a point. 
10 At this time, Clark and his colleagues did not make a crisp distinction between background knowledge and 
designs. That came later, in Design Rules (dicussed below). 
11 On the origin of this so-called “shusa” system at Toyota in the 1950s see Fujimoto, (1999, pp. 73-74). 
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management matters! 
Overlapping Problem-Solving Cycles (Concurrent Engineering): The phrase “concurrent 
engineering” was not in common use when Clark and Fujimoto were conducting their research, and it 
does not appear in the book.12 Nevertheless, Clark and Fujimoto identified and advocated practices that 
are now the hallmark of concurrent engineering, specifically: (1) overlapping the stages of the product 
development process; and (2) “high-bandwidth” and “bilateral” communication between those involved 
in each stage. The aim of overlapping stages was to anticipate downstream problems and fix them early, 
thus shortening development time. Clark and Fujimoto argued that this practice could be effective only if 
the upstream and downstream participants communicated in real time from the beginning of the process. 
This in turn meant that the work of project participants would change significantly. Those involved in the 
early stages (design) had to propose solutions that were not yet fully approved and monitor the project to 
completion, while those involved in later stages (production) had to participate in the project very early 
on. Overlapping cycles might shrink end-to-end development time, but at the cost of drastically 
expanding each department’s scope of activity and interactions with other departments!  
To justify the increased costs of concurrent engineering, Clark and Fujimoto developed constructs 
to measure the overlap, intensity and effectiveness of interdepartmental communication. They combined 
these metrics into a a single “integrated problem-solving index.” (Combining metrics into an index was 
one of Clark’s favorite ways of dealing with complex data.) They went on to show that Japanese firms 
generally had higher index scores, but, more importantly, that high scores were correlated with superior 
performance in terms of lead time, development productivity and product quality. 
Co-development: a new role for customers and suppliers: By the late 1980s it was well known that 
Japanese firms were less vertically integrated and relied more heavily on their suppliers than their 
western counterparts. Clark and Fujimoto’s contribution was to show how vertical relationships affected 
product development. In their view, the ideal state of “integration,” which gave rise to product 
“integrity,” did not stop at the boundaries of a firm, but extended backward to its suppliers and forward 
to  its customers as well. External integration by definition took place across a firm’s boundaries. The idea 
                                                           
12 Nevins and Whitney’s classic text Concurrent Design of Products and Processes, which set forth the principles of 
concurrent engineering, appeared in 1989, but Clark did not become aware of this work until after Product 
Development Performance was written. 
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was to shorten overall development time and improve the quality of the product by involving customers 
and suppliers in the early stages of product design (Clark, 1989). These practices allowed mutual 
adaptation of product and process designs to take place, which in turn led to improvements in product 
functionality, cost, quality, and delivery time.  
Clark and Fujimoto documented major differences, not only in the degree to which Japanese 
automaker were vertically separated, but also in the ways customers and suppliers participated in new 
product development. For example, U.S. firms used armslength contracts to manage suppliers and relied 
mostly on off-the-shelf parts for their new vehicles. In contrast, Japanese automakers brought their 
suppliers into the product development process and, as a result, had much higher percentages of newly 
designed parts in their new vehicles (Clark and Fujimoto, 1991, p.151, Figures 6-8). 
 
3.3 Beyond Projects: Corporate Strategy for New Product Development 
 
Although the management of projects was crucial to successful product development, Clark was 
convinced that there were other levels of the product development process where management mattered 
as well. In Revolutionizing Product Development, working with Steven Wheelwright, Clark looked beyond 
individual projects to how companies could make product development as a whole a source of lasting 
competitive advantage.   
Projects, Wheelwright and Clark observed, were the end result of a larger process, which could 
be viewed as a funnel (Figure 1). The funnel in turn served to highlight two fundamental managerial 
roles: portfolio selection and cross-project learning. In the first place, general managers played a key role 
in defining and managing the company’s project portfolio. They chartered projects so that resources were 
not scattered and the overall strategic thrust was consistent. Furthermore, efficiency and effectiveness in 
the execution of projects were correlated with how well senior managers could explain (1) a project’s 
objectives; and (2) how it fit into the company’s strategy. Wheelwright and Clark’s classification of 
projects—research and advanced engineering, breakthrough, platform and derivatives—is now a 
standard in project portfolio management. 
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Figure 1 : The development funnel (Clark and Wheelwright, 1992) 
 
Source : Wheelwright and Clark, 1992, p. 35. 
 
Projects also created opportunities to learn. Wheelwright and Clark emphasized time and time 
again that the gains from a particular project were not limited to the profits from selling the end product. 
Projects also played a key role in the firm’s knowledge creation process. Each project should therefore 
have built-in feedback loops, through which the knowledge gained by the project team could be 
captured, analyzed and disseminated within the organization. 
Wheelwright and Clark thus saw project porfolios as one of a firm’s main engines of growth and 
renewal. Indeed in a series of Harvard Business Review articles and a book, Clark, writing with Kent 
Bowen, Charles Holloway, Steven Wheelwright and Dorothy Leonard-Barton, spoke of two roles for 
projects within a company. First, projects were an excellent way to marshall the knowledge and 
capabilities lodged within business units to create innovative solutions. Far from being at odds with one 
another, projects and functional departments could interact in positive ways to develop and exploit a 
company’s learning capacity (Bowen et. al., 1994).  Making the same point, Iansiti and Clark (1994) 
described in glowing terms the co-evolution of projects and organizational capabilities at Nissan and 
NEC from one product generation to another:  
The essence of integration is the generation, fusion and accumulation of knowledge: the capacity 
to merge new knowledge about the impact of possibilities with deep accumulated knowledge of 
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the complex capability base of the organization” (Iansiti and Clark, 1994, p. 602).13 
 
Projects were also a way to train the organization’s future managers. Managing a project required 
the person in charge to go beyond his or her original business unit and adopt a cross-functional point of 
view. In this fashion, functional managers were forced to develop general skills that would later be 
valuable to the organization.  Projects thus served the twofold purpose of integrating a manager’s skills 
and improving them (Leonard-Barton et. al., 1994). 
 
3.4 The importance of management and management systems 
 
Overall, Clark’s work on manufacturing and product development showed that performance 
differences among companies arose not because of the technologies used or the companies’ environment, 
but rather because of the ways resources, people and technology were managed. By focusing on 
management, Clark and his colleagues offered an original explanation for the decline of U.S. companies 
in the late 1970s and helped open up a new line of research on product development. It is thus not 
surprising that Clark’s works (Hayes and Clark, 1985; Hayes, Wheelwright and Clark, 1988;  Henderson 
and Clark, 1990; Clark and Fujimoto, 1991; Iansiti and Clark, 1994) were among the most quoted in the 
seminal paper by Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997), which defined “dynamic capabilities” and argued that 
such capabilities lay at the core of a company’s competitive success. 
However, the research summarized above failed to explain why U.S. firms did not adopt 
Japanese methods sooner. Japanese methods were not “foreign”— paradoxically they were based on 
management principles taught to the Japanese after World War II by American professors (Hayes, 
Wheelwright and Clark, 1988). Clark and his colleagues believed that the inertia of U.S. firms was linked, 
first, to the enduring influence of Taylor’s scientific management principles, and second, to the 
dominance of financial and marketing managers, not manufacturing managers, in the top ranks of U.S. 
companies (Hayes and Abernathy, 1980). But this explanation led to a conundrum: if the new 
management methods were truly valuable, why did financially sophisticated top managers not see their 
worth? 
This puzzle led to Clark’s first collaboration with Carliss Baldwin, a colleague in the Finance unit 
of Harvard Business School. A financial economist by training, Baldwin was strongly influenced by 
                                                           
13 On this question of knowledge creation, see also, Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995). 
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Stewart Myers’ (1984) rebuttal the TOM group’s arguments about American managers’ short-termism 
and “myopia” (see above). According to Myers, the problems Hayes and Abernathy (1980) and Hayes 
and Garvin (1982) identified arose, not because finance theory was “wrong,” but because it was 
misapplied by managers in the field.  
Adopting Myers’ logic, and drawing on earlier work on resource allocation by their colleague, 
Joseph Bower (1970), Baldwin and Clark (1991, 1994) subjected the new paradigms of manufacturing and 
product development to the analytic methods of finance. The new paradigms, they noted, required 
investment in the following organizational capabilities: 
• External integration, leading to quality; 
• Internal integration, leading to speed and efficiency; 
• Flexibility, leading to responsiveness and variety; 
• The capacity to experiment, leading to continuous improvement; 
• The capacity to cannibalize, leading to radical innovation. 
 
From a financial perspective, these capabilities were not simple investments, but were “platforms” that in 
turn generated “options.” (In finance, an option is “the right but not the obligation to take a particular 
action.”) The benefits derived from such investments were thus necessarily complex and difficult to 
quantify—in the language of finance, the investments had complex, contingent payoffs. At the same time, 
opportunities to make these investments generally arose quite low in the organization—on the factory 
floor, in engineering departments, and in the new product development groups of the company. In these 
“non-strategic” areas,  financial analysis was generally based on simple discounted cash flow 
calculations, which were not capable of recognizing option values, much less option platforms.  
Therefore, Baldwin and Clark argued, there was a fundamental mismatch between the nature of 
the investment opportunities in manufacturing and new product development and the methods used (in 
U.S. corporations) to assess their financial worth. This mismatch had a systematic and pernicious effect on 
investment decisions: it caused managers to favor short-term profitability over the creation of capabilities 
and learning capacity. Ironically, companies with less rigid capital budgeting systems were better off than 
those applying “the most advanced” financial methods—because the methods used were not advanced 
enough! 
Baldwin and Clark’s research into resource allocation systems showed the complexity of the 
capability creation process and the effects of various routines, which, while seeming to steer companies in 
the right direction, could potentially lead them to failure later on. Firms that experienced success at a 
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given time were not necessarily those that would survive and prosper over the long term. Thus contrary 
to the reasoning of evolutionary theorists like Dosi (1988): “The more technical progress is cumulative at a 
firm level, the more success breeds success” (p. 1161), Clark’s work showed that success could put the 
company on a trajectory that would ultimately lead to its downfall. Indeed, “the failure of established 
firms” was the overarching theme of Clark’s work with William Abernathy, discussed in the next section. 
Success breeding failure was also central to the thinking of Clark’s colleague, Clayton Christensen, who 
was beginning to develop his own theory of “disruptive innovation” at this time (Christensen and 
Rosenbloom, 1995; Bower and Christensen, 1996; Christensen, 1997). 
 
4. Opening the “black box” of technology 
 
4.1 Early Work with Abernathy 
 
Alongside his work on manufacturing and product development, Clark developed a third area of 
research focused on innovation, competition, and industry evolution. Indeed, Clark saw very early on 
that typical economic theories of innovation were insuff icient for understanding how firms, products 
and technologies evolve. One of the diff iculties encountered by these theories involved the unit of 
analysis, which was usually a country, a sector, or a technology. (See Freeman and Soete, 1997 for a 
survey.) The high level of aggregation in their observations prompted economists to develop concepts 
that were too general for understanding the dynamics of individual firms. Clark, influenced by 
economic historian, Nathan Rosenberg (1982), was convinced that this difficulty “flow[ed] in part from 
a reluctance to break open the ‘black box’ that is a specif ic technology in order to understand its 
competitive and organizational implications” (Henderson and Clark, 1989, p. 8).  
Clark’s work on technological and industry evolution began in close cooperation with William 
Abernathy, whose impact on Clark’s thinking was profound. First, in a Harvard Business Review article 
published in 1981 and a book, Industrial Renaissance, which appeared in 1983, Clark and Abernathy, 
together with Alan Kantrow, advanced the argument that many firms in mature industries in the U.S. 
were facing a new type of industrial competition caused by the “de-maturity” of their underlying product 
and process designs. De-maturity had the potential to bring down established firms if they did not adapt 
to their new circumstances (Abernathy, Clark, Kantrow, 1981, 1983). 
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The “new industrial competition” argument was in fact an extension of Abernathy’s earlier work 
on industry evolution. In the 1970s, Abernathy, writing with James Utterback (1978) and alone (1978), 
argued that industrial competition was driven by the staged evolution of products and production 
processes. In the early or fluid stage of industry development, customers’ requirements were not well 
understood. Competition at this stage involved much experimentation and a rapid turnover of product 
designs. The production processes appropriate to this stage were commensurately small-scale, flexible 
and labor-intensive, with low barriers to entry. At some point, however, some dimensions of product 
design (the so-called “core concepts”) became standardized, that is, fixed for a large part of the market. 
This transition was called the emergence of “a dominant design” (Abernathy, 1978, p. 75; Abernathy and 
Clark, 1985, p. 14). After this point, competition would focus on cost reduction, quality enhancement, and 
variety within the constraints of the dominant design. Large-scale capital investments were often the key 
to success in this second stage. As a result, after the advent of a dominant design, smaller firms would 
exit and the industry would consolidate until only a few large firms remained. 
The Abernathy-Utterback theory of industry evolution explained patterns of development in 
many industries in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. However, it did not explain what 
was happening to U.S. firms in the 1970s as they confronted Japanese competitors using the new 
manufacturing and product development paradigms described above. Thus Abernathy, Clark and 
Kantrow took on the task of expanding the Abernathy-Utterback framework to include this new form of 
competition. 
Reading Industrial Renaissance today, it is amazing to see how many of Clark’s design theoretic 
ideas are present here in embryonic form. They include: 
• Designs embody a “series of technological choices,” which can be described as a set of 
“parameters” and “attributes;” 
• Design choices form “problem-solving hierarchies,” one for producers and one for users 
(“buyers”); 
• Learning —by both producers and users—involves working down the hierarchies, “weeding 
out unattractive alternatives, thereby reducing uncertainty;” 
• Such learning “shrinks the universe of acceptable technological alternatives,” leading 
eventually to “the establishment of [fixed] design hierarchies based on specific core 
concepts.” 
 
These insights formed the basis for all of Clark’s later theorizing about design and industry evolution. 
According to Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow, hierarchical problem solving, which was the 
natural mode of technological evolution, would lead in the end to a mature, but stagnant industry: 
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Competition proceeds along narrowing lines until, in a mature industry, the technological 
positions taken by the major producers are indistinguishable…. Attributes that had once been 
“open” to technological experimentation become over time fixed or “closed.” (Abernathy, Clark 
and Kantrow, p. 27) 
 
But, they were quick to say, the process could be reversed. Given an exogenous shock in technology or 
demand, an industry could return to an earlier, “more open” state of competition. Such changes entailed 
“working back up through the same design hierarchy” by reopening previously “frozen” design 
parameters. This was the phase of “de-maturity,”when established firms could face innovations that: 
[make] obsolete existing capital equipment, labor skills, materials, components, management 
expertise, and organizational capabilities. [They destroy] the value of present competence … [and 
may] attract new entrants into an industry or even redraw an industry’s competitive boundaries. 
(Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow, p. 28) 
 
Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow and later Abernathy and Clark (1985) thus provided the foundations for 
the seminal work by Anderson and Tushman on competency enhancing and competency destroying 
innovations (Tushman and Anderson, 1986; Anderson and Tushman, 1990). But, as was typical in much 
of Abernathy’s work, key points in the argument were simply asserted and not developed or defended. 
Tragically, Abernathy did not have enough time to nail down all the parts of his grand theory before his 
death. 
The deep structure—“the logic”—of Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow’s argument was based on the 
concept of two co-evolving hierarchies, one for producers and one for buyers. But the authors did not 
attempt to document these hierarchies empirically. For empirical purposes, they introduced a simpler 
construct: the “transilience matrix” (Abernathy, Clark and Kantrow, pp. 109 et. seq.) This matrix appeared 
several times in Clark’s writings of the 1980s (Abernathy and Clark, 1985; Clark and Rothman, 1986; 
Clark, 1987). It is sometimes confused with, but is in fact different from the more famous Henderson-
Clark matrix of innovations (discussed below). Abernathy and Clark were concerned with the impact of 
innovations on firm competencies. They distinguished between “technology/production” competencies 
on the one hand, and “market/customer linkages”on the other. Henderson and Clark omitted 
market/customer linkages from their picture and looked simply at the location of innovations in a 
complex technological system. Hence the key phrase “architectural innovation” has fundamentally 
different meanings in the writings of Henderson and Clark vs. Abernathy and Clark. 
For Abernathy and Clark, design hierarchies and transilience maps were complementary ways of 
describing how innovations affected the evolution of industries. Design hierarchies were closer to the 
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basic phenomenon and logically more robust, but harder to observe. Transilience matrices were easier to 
operationalize in empirical work, but were basically ad hoc and tautological. What was needed then was a 
deepening of the theoretical and empirical base on which these concepts rested. William Abernathy, the 
originator of many  of the ideas, died in 1984. After his death, Clark continued to work on Abernathy’s 
theoretical agenda, even as he was participating in the major empirical studies of manufacturing and 
product development described above. Indeed, in the mid 1980s, Clark’s field research and empirical 
analysis, as well as his reading outside of fields of economics and management, began to have a 
significant impact on his theory development. 
 
4.2 Innovation Studies meet Design Theory 
 
The new depth in Clark’s thinking was first evident in “The Interaction of Design Hierarchies 
and Market Concepts in Technological Evolution,” published in 1985 in Research Policy (Clark, 1985). In 
this article, Clark for the first time drew on the scholarly work of design theorists, specifically Christopher 
Alexander (1964) and David Marple (1961). He took key ideas about the evolution of organizations from 
Richard Nelson and Sidney Winter (1982) and about users from Eric von Hippel (1976).  
Clark used other scholars’ ideas plus his own experience to construct a microeconomic rationale 
for the twin hierarchies that lay at the core of Abernathy’s theory of innovation. He also shifted his focus 
away from “innovations” and “industries” to “designers” and “users.” Because of his work on product 
development, Clark had come to believe that understanding innovation required an understanding of 
how designers responded to the changing desires of users.14   
From Alexander (1964) and Marple (1961), Clark took two important ideas:  
• The objective of all design work is to ensure “fitness” between the object designed and its 
context of use.  
• Design work is a form of problem-solving and is hierarchical by nature. Some decisions 
necessarily precede others. High-level decisions (e.g., what fuel will an automobile use) 
create an agenda of subsequent problems-to-be-solved.  
 
The first of these ideas—fitness—established that designs were subject to competition and evolution: 
“more fit” designs competed with and replaced those that were “less fit.” Moreover, the arbiters of “more 
fit” were users, whose own preferences might change as they learned about new products. The second 
                                                           
14 Interestingly, although he drew on the work of von Hippel (1976), Clark did not go so far as to make users 
designers in their own right. In this respect, he followed the taste of the TOM group and most design theorists. 
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idea—hierarchy—was already the backbone of Clark’s earlier work with Abernathy. In effect Clark used 
design theorists to justify what he had previously merely asserted. For example, in defense of hierarchies, 
he included a lengthy quote from Alexander which began: “The organization of any complex physical 
object is hierarchical… ” (p. 241). And he reproduced Marple’s drawing of the actual design hierarchy of 
the ducts and valves of a nuclear reactor (p. 242).  
But Alexander and Marple were silent on the possibility of changing customer preferences. Thus 
arguing from first principles and using automobiles as as an example, Clark claimed that customer 
preferences were necessarily based on experience and evolved in a hierarchical fashion as well. This was 
his “hierarchy of concept:”15 
[C]ustomer learning is focused initially on the higher order concepts… . It was, thus, no accident 
that early customer decisions about automobiles were framed in terms of a choice between a 
“horseless carriage” and a “carriage with a horse.” …[A] set of subordinate concepts … gave 
further definition [to the concept of automobile]: speed, mobility, endurance, payload and so 
forth. … One could not imagine widespread use of words like “roadster” or “touring car” or 
“coupe” in the 1890s when the “horseless carriage” was first introduced. These were distinctions 
and categorizations that rested on years of customer experience, on new habits of transportation, 
and of course, on the development of the product itself. (Clark, 1985 pp. 245-6, Emphasis added.) 
 
These were the same basic ideas as in Industrial Renaissance, but the arguments were set forth 
with much greater depth and rigor. Building on design theory and his knowledge of the history of 
automobiles, Clark showed readers what it meant for two related hierarchies—of product designs and 
user concepts—to co-evolve, each influencing the other.16 Process design, he said, worked the same way, 
except that its hierarchy of concept reflected the desires of  producers—for low cost, rapid cycle time, and 
high reliability. (Clark and Abernathy did not make rigid distinctions between products and processes, 
nor between products and services. Their overarching concern was with the structure of problem 
solving—hence design—whatever the context.)  
Discussing the implications of his “co-evolving hierarchies,” Clark restated the arguments about 
competition found in Industrial Renaissance:  
Movements down the hierarchy are associated with the refinements or extension of higher-order 
concepts. Innovation of this kind … entrenches the established approach. 
 
[In contrast] movements up the hierarchy are associated with departures from existing 
                                                           
15 Alexander also proposed a “hierarchy of concepts,” but defined it as the way a designer would organize his 
problem solving. Thus Alexander’s hierarchy of concepts corresponds to Clark’s hierarchy of design. (Alexander, 
1971, pp. 60-63) 
16 Clark (1983) contained a preview of parts of his argument. 
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approaches… . [They] destroy the value of established commitments and competence, and call 
forth new skills and resources. (Clark, 1985, p. 249)  
 
One of the things Clark did not do in this paper was identify problem-solving hierarchies with 
architecture. This omission is noteworthy because Herbert Simon had already linked architecture to hierarchy 
in his famous paper, “The Architecture of Complexity,” which first appeared in 1962 and was included in 
the second edition of The Sciences of the Artificial published in 1981 (Simon, 1962; 1981). In fact, Clark 
referenced Simon in connection with hierarchy:  
As Simon has suggested hierarchy is often used to deal with complex phenomena, and 
hierarchical structures have been widely used in models of memory and linguistics. (Clark, 1985, 
p. 241) 
 
But his knowledge of Simon appears to have been gleaned indirectly from a consumer behavior text by 
John Howard (Clark, 1985, footnote 17, p. 241). Howard’s reference in turn was to the first edition of The 
Sciences of the Artificial, which did not include “The Architecture of Complexity” (Howard, 1977; Simon, 
1969). 
Nevertheless, although Clark apparently did not have much knowledge of Simon’s prior work, 
he was following in Simon’s footsteps in that he was looking to represent products and their designs in a 
more formal way. This quest would eventually lead to his breakthrough paper with Rebecca Henderson, 
in which architecture and architectural innovation occupied center stage (Henderson and Clark, 1990). 
But in 1985 that paper still lay in the far-distant future. 
 
4.3 Architectural Innovation—Trial Runs 
 
The question, why do establish firms fail, took hold of Clark’s imagination in the 1980s and 
seemingly would not let go. Eventually, he provided an answer to this question that was deep, creative 
and compelling. But his path to the answer was not smooth: in the late 1980s, Clark struggled mightily to 
bring his ideas into focus. Between the “Interaction of Hierarchies” in 1985 and “Architectural 
Innovation” in 1990, Clark wrote three other papers all of which addressed the same basic question. In 
these trial runs, he rehearsed and refined  his ideas about the structure of products, knowledge and 
organizations. 
The first of these papers, “Managing Technology in International Competition: The Case of 
Product Development in Response to Foreign Entry,” was written in 1985, and published (essentially 
unchanged) in 1988. This paper did two things. First, it presented evidence from a range of industries 
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showing that established U.S. firms often failed when confronted by certain kinds of innovative 
challenges. Not only in autos, but in radios, copiers and integrated circuit packaging, relatively large, 
experienced U.S. companies had lost ground to smaller, less experienced foreign entrants who made 
seemingly minor innovations in the basic product or production system. Thus there was a larger pattern to 
be explained. 
In the “Foreign Entry” paper, Clark also began to develop an information-processing and 
problem-solving view of “the archetypal firm.” These sections of the paper were heavily influenced by 
Ramachandran “Jai” Jaikumar, who, together with Roger Bohn, was at this time attempting to formulate 
a theory of the stages of knowledge in manufacturing organizations (Jaikumar and Bohn, 1986; Bohn and 
Jaikumar, 1986). Indeed many of the concepts found in this paper—for example, complexity, ambiguity 
and uncertainty, and know-how vs. know-why—were due to Jaikumar and were only peripherally 
related to the problems Clark was trying to address. Today the paper reads as a provocative jumble of 
empirical evidence and partially worked out theoretical concepts. It was full of ideas, but they were not 
coherent. 
The second paper was an undated working paper from about 1988, entitled “Knowledge, 
Problem-solving, and Innovation in the Evolutionary Firm.” Here Clark abstracted and slightly 
formalized the theoretical arguments of the “Foreign Entry” paper. The ideas were mostly the same, but 
Clark appears to be grasping for his own “architecture,” that is, a structure that would clarify his vision. 
One can almost hear a mentor, perhaps Paul Lawrence (who is mentioned in the acknowledgements), 
saying “just write it all down Kim, write down what you mean.” 
This paper is also noteworthy because here, for the first and only time until Design Rules (2000), 
Clark directly cited Herbert Simon’s Sciences of the Artificial (1969). However, he alluded to Simon’s 
cognitive model of problem solving and cited the first (1969) edition. (Recall that “The Architecture of 
Complexity” was not included in the first edition, but appeared in the second and subsequent editions.) 
Thus Simon’s ideas about the division of work, hierarchy, architecture, and “near-decomposability” did 
not enter into Clark’s thinking at this time.  
Indeed if Christopher Alexander and Herbert Simon today are viewed as the progenitors of 
modern design theory, Clark was very much in “the Alexander line.” Even Design Rules (written with 
Carliss Baldwin), although it acknowledged Simon and retold the fable of Tempus and Hora, was not 
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steeped in Simon’s thinking. Clark did not see himself as working on Simon’s agenda, striving to create a 
new “science of design” (Simon, 1969, 1981; Chapter 5). His focus was always on people working in 
organizations, not on the abstract structure of the designs they worked on.17 
The third paper in this series was the working paper that preceded Henderson and Clark’s 
breakthrough paper: “Architectural Innovation: The Reconfiguration of Existing Products and the Failure 
of Established Firms” (Henderson and Clark, 1990). In contrast to “Foreign Entry”, in this case the 
differences between the working paper and the final published version were profound! The working 
paper offered some exciting ideas and a lot of evidence, but the main line of argument was obscure and 
difficult to follow. Henderson and Clark had not yet found the right balance between authoritative 
description and mind-numbing detail. 
Indeed this working paper would not be worth mentioning but for the fact that it contained the 
seeds of an important idea. Taking their lead from Alexander (1964), Henderson and Clark worked out a 
mathematical representation of the design of a room fan.18  The fan’s design, they said, could be 
represented as a hierarchical set of mathematical relationships in which component parameters determined 
system parameters, and system parameters in turn determined performance on dimensions users cared 
about. The ultimate worth of a design could then be represented as a utility function defined over user 
requirements. Thus design selection and evalution could be framed as an economic choice problem.19  
None of the work on the mathematical representation of designs made it into the final published 
version of the paper. This is understandable: the ideas were sketchy and did not hold up well under 
scrutiny. But the characterization of complex designs as hierarchies of parameters and dependencies 
reappeared ten years later in Design Rules. And the idea that design selection could be framed as an 
economic choice problem became the fundamental premise of that book, captured by the axiom, 
“Designers see and seek value.”  
In the short run, however, what made it into print was the room fan. Even this humble artifact, 
                                                           
17 In contrast, the abstract structure of designs was one of Baldwin’s primary concerns, because structural 
representations were pre-requisites to the application of financial valuation tools. 
18 It seems likely that key sections of the paper were drafted during the hot summer months of 1989 in a room 
without airconditioning. 
19 Simon had done this already, but was not cited (Simon, 1969, 1981; Chapters 2 and 5). 
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Henderson and Clark said, could be deconstructed into a set of components—motor, base, blades—and an 
architecture that specified the linkages between components.  
 
4.4 Architectural Innovation—The Real Thing 
 
Henderson and Clark’s “Architectural Innovation” paper, published in Administrative Sciences 
Quarterly in 1990, brought a new point of view into studies of innovation—a view based on the material 
properties of objects and processes and concomitant constraints on their designs. When the paper was published, 
the prevailing classification scheme for innovations was a unidimensional scale. At one extreme, 
innovations were “radical”; at the  other, they were “incremental.” Henderson and Clark contended that, 
in light of the complex actual structure of products, this scale was too simple. They then introduced the 
concept of a product architecture. This idea was the direct descendant of Abernathy and Clark’s “design 
hierarchies,” but was now defined as “how the components [of a product] will work together.” And as 
indicated, Henderson and Clark explained the key concepts of “components” and “architecture” using 
the homely example of a room fan.  
Although the existence of architecture was a necessary premise for the argument in the paper, 
architecture was not in fact what the paper was about. Its true focus was how knowledge works in 
organizations. Thus Henderson and Clark moved quickly from architecture to knowledge, asserting that 
“successful product development requires two kinds of knowledge[:] component knowledge… [and] 
architectural knowledge.” (p. 11). From these two categories, Henderson and Clark derived a 2x2 matrix 
for classifying innovations. The old categories, radical and incremental, appeared on the main diagonal. 
Two new categories—modular and architectural—appeared on the off-diagonal blocks (Figure 2). 
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Figure 2: Henderson and Clark classification scheme for innovations 
 
 
 
 
A modular innovation, according to Henderson and Clark, “changes only the core design concepts 
of a technology,” and not the architecture. Their example of such an innovation was the substitution of a 
digital for an analog phone. But Henderson and Clark were not much interested in modular 
innovations,20 thus they moved on as quickly as possible to architectural innovations: 
The essence of an architectural innovation is the reconfiguration of an established system to link 
together existing components in a new way. (Henderson and Clark, 1990, p. 12) 
 
They then tied their notion of architectural innovation to Abernathy and Utterback’s (1978) 
concept of dominant design:  
[T]he emergence of a dominant design … is equivalent to the general acceptance of a product 
architecture. … A dominant design incorporates a range of basic choices … that are not revisited 
in every subsequent design. … [P]rogress then takes the shape of improvements in the 
components within the framework of a stable architecture. (Henderson and Clark, 1990, p. 14) 
 
Given a dominant design, basic choices did not have to be revisited, hence experimentation with different 
                                                           
20 Henderson and Clark adopted the 2x2 framework at the suggestion of an anonymous ASQ reviewer—surely one of 
most insightful reviewers in the history of the journal. The 2x2 had an extra quadrant, which needed a name and a 
definition. Thus “modular innovation” was thrust on Henderson and Clark by the exigencies of their new 
framework. Sometimes architecture matters! 
  
Low Incremental Modular
Innovation Innovation
Impact on
Architecture
(Linkages)
High Architectural Radical
Innovation Innovation
Low High
Impact on Components (Core Concepts)
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ways of linking components, i.e., different architectures, would disappear: 
Firms cease to invest in learning about alternative configurations of the established set of 
components. (Henderson and Clark, 1990, p. 14) 
 
This contention led to the crux of Henderson and Clark’s argument. In large, complex 
organizations,  they said, the product’s architecture was not seen as a whole, but became invisibly 
embedded in “the communication channels, information filters and problem-solving strategies” of the 
organization (pp. 15 et. seq.) On the one hand, such embedding was efficient because it streamlined the 
flow of work. On the other hand, problems would arise if and when the organization was confronted by a 
competitor’s architectural innovation. In those circumstances, the organization would not be able to 
retrieve its architectural knowledge, hence it would not be able to adapt its products and processes to 
meet the competitive challenge. 
Henderson and Clark backed up their theory with detailed evidence from the photolithographic 
equipment industry. They showed how, over several generations, established firms failed to adapt to 
architectural innovations introduced by upstart challengers. For example, Kasper, a maker of contact 
aligners and the market leader at one point, failed to respond to—or even understand—the threat posed 
by Canon’s new proximity aligner. Kasper did not see, quite literally, what Canon had accomplished:  
The Canon aligner was evaluated by a team at Kasper and pronounced to be a copy of a Kasper 
machine. Kasper evaluated it against the criteria that it used for evaluating its own aligners— 
criteria that had been developed during its experience with contact aligners. The technical 
features that made Canon’s aligner a significant advance [which had to do with the way 
components were linked together] … were not observed because they were not considered 
important” (Henderson and Clark, 1990, p. 26).  
 
In the end, Kasper disappeared from the market. A few years later, essentially the same scenario 
recurred, between Canon and Nikon. This time, the new incumbent, Canon, disappeared!21 
Henderson and Clark’s theory of why established firms fail was predicated on what they claimed 
was a “natural tendency” of organizations: 
[T]here appears to be a tendency for active learning among engineers to focus on improvement in 
performance within a stable product architecture. In this context, learning means learning about 
components and the core concepts that underlie them. Given the way knowledge tends to be 
organized within the firm, learning about changes in the architecture of the product is unlikely to 
                                                           
21 The dynamic Henderson and Clark described was similar to that of “disruptive innovation,” in the theory later 
developed by Clayton Christensen (Christensen and Rosenbloom, 1995; Bower and Christensen, 1996; Christensen, 
1997). Christensen was a doctoral student at Harvard Business School in 1990 and joined the TOM faculty in 1992. 
His theory of disruptive innovation had to do with changing customer demands and market linkages, while 
Henderson and Clark’s theory focused on the embedding and retrieval of technological knowledge in a firm. The two 
theories were not mutually exclusive, but dealt with complementary facets of the same, very complex phenomenon.  
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occur naturally. Learning about changes in architecture … may therefore require explicit 
management and attention.” (Henderson and Clark, 1990, p. 28) 
 
However, if we adopt a wider point of view, the tendency they described is not universal. Indeed in some 
settings, ongoing architectural learning appears to be the norm. For example, in buildings, the core 
concepts—floors, windows, doors— have been stable for hundreds of years, but enormous variety can be 
realized by combining these concepts in different ways (Alexander, 1979). Thus while Henderson and 
Clark’s theory of embedded architectural knowledge might hold in some cases, it almost certainly did not 
hold in all.   
Nevertheless, the fact that the theory was not universally true did not lessen its importance or 
impact. Henderson and Clark’s accomplishment was to set forth the first coherent argument backed up with 
evidence about how design structure affects competition among firms. The argument deserved to be taken 
seriously, and it was. It was what Pareto called a “fruitful error…, full of seeds, bursting with its own 
corrections.” And one of the most promising seeds lay in the neglected quadrant of the 2x2 matrix, the 
one labeled “modular innovations.”  
 
5 The Power of Modularity 
 
5.1 The Setting 
 
In the early 1990s, the themes of architecture and modularity were in the air. Scholars in many 
fields were seeking to understand complex systems, architectures and modules more deeply. It is beyond 
our scope to trace the many parallel and intersecting lines of work, so we will mention only a few of the 
works that significantly influenced Clark’s thinking.  
First, coming to management from mechanical engineering and building on design theorists Pahl 
and Beitz (1984), Hubka and Eder (1988) and Nam Suh (1990), Karl Ulrich (1995) clarified the meaning of 
the term “product architecture” and proposed a typology. (Henderson and Clark had simply asserted 
that “architectures exist.”) Ulrich was the first to distinguish between “modular” and “integral” 
architectures, a fundamental distinction that survives today.22 
                                                           
22 Clark did not like the term “integral.” From his work on product development, he associated “integrity” and 
“integration” with good qualities in a design, whereas “integral architectures” were non-modular and in that sense 
bad. He preferred the term “interdependent.” 
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Second, Ulrich’s close colleague, Steven Eppinger developed tools and methods for observing 
and representing design dependencies using the framework of Design Structure Matrices (DSMs). These 
matrices made the “linkages between components” and the “communication channels and information 
filters” of an organization visible for the first time. (Eppinger, 1991; Eppinger et. al., 1994) 
Third, Richard Langlois and Paul Robertson (1992) argued that a network of firms working 
within a modular architecture would innovate faster and more effectively than a large, integrated firm. 
Writing for practitioners, Charles Ferguson and Charles Morris put a strategic spin on this argument, 
explaining “How Architecture Wins Technology Wars” (Morris and Ferguson, 1993; Ferguson and 
Morris, 1993). 
Carliss Baldwin began working with Kim Clark in this heady intellectual environment. Their 
focus was on the fourth quadrant of the Henderson-Clark matrix: modular innovation. As an outsider in 
the TOM group, Baldwin was struck by how often “modularity,” “modular flexibility,” and “modular 
mix-and-match” were cited as sources of competitive advantage in both manufacturing and product 
product development field studies.  
Baldwin and Clark, like many others, were also fascinated by events in the computer industry in 
the 1980s and early 1990s (Baldwin and Clark, 1997a). The big technological event of this era was the 
advent of personal computers. At first, the story of PCs appeared to be a counterexample to Henderson 
and Clark’s thesis that established firms fail when confronted by new architectures. IBM, though not the 
first to introduce a personal computer, entered the market decisively in 1981 with a new (and highly 
modular) product architecture. Within months IBM was the dominant firm in a vastly expanded and 
growing market. But by 1990, IBM had lost “control” of the PC architecture to component suppliers Intel 
and Microsoft. It also faced severe price competition from networked PCs and workstations, and thus 
was struggling in its other product lines as well.23 The computer industry thus appeared to be the perfect 
place in which to study modular architectures and the competitive dynamics of modular innovation. 
Design Rules: The Power of Modularity was published in 2000, the result of a decade of work.24 The 
                                                           
23 The Langlois-Robertson and the Ferguson-Morris works cited above attemped to make sense of these events. 
Another key contribution was Andrew Grove’s book, Only the Paranoid Survive, which told Grove’s version of the 
story of how Intel succeeded where IBM failed. These are only three among a vast library. (Langlois and Robertson, 
1992; Ferguson and Morris, 1993; Morris and Ferguson, 1993; Grove, 1996.) 
24 The first working paper on the option value of modularity appeared in 1992 (Baldwin and Clark, 1992b). A preview 
of the arguments in Design Rules appeared in the Harvard Business Review in 1997 (Baldwin and Clark, 1997b). 
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aim of the book was to build on existing theories of design and complex adaptive systems to create an 
economic theory of design evolution and industry change under modular architectures. The book 
differed in style from Clark’s previous work in three major ways: 
• It went to great lengths to define terms and concepts in order to create a common vocabulary 
among the separate disciplines of economics, management studies, complexity science, and 
engineering. 
• It made extensive and operational use of design theory tools, in particular, Design Structure 
Matrices and design hierarchies. 
• It routinely used mathematical modeling, especially models from finance, to analyze the 
economic structure of design decisions.  
 
In writing Design Rules, Baldwin and Clark adopted two principles. First, they believed that the 
rate and direction of technical change depended on the “deep structure” of objects and the processes used 
to design and make them.25 Thus to understand technological change, one had to go to the designs 
themselves, i.e., to engineering descriptions of artifacts and processes. Second, they restricted their 
attention to computer designs and the computer industry. Modular designs and innovations arose in 
many places, but their preliminary surveys of various engineering literatures indicated that modularity 
served different purposes in different settings. Modularity could be used to reduce complexity; to enable 
parallel work; or to permit adaptation to uncertain events (pp. 90-91). Given such a multifaceted 
phenomenon, Baldwin and Clark felt that a necessary first step was to develop a coherent theory for one 
set of designs. If the theory worked in one setting, they reasoned, it could then be tried out in others. (See 
Baldwin, Hienerth and von Hippel, 2006, on the role of a base case in theory building.) 
 
5.2 What is Modularity? Where Does It Come From? 
 
The notion of a modular design is the central theme of the book. Baldwin and Clark defined a 
modular system as one whose architecture allows some subsets of elements to be designed, produced or 
used independently. Modules, therefore, are units of a larger system that are structurally independent of one 
another but work together. In order for such a system to work there must be design rules specifying:  
(1) the product’s “architecture”;  
(2) the interfaces between modules; and  
(3) the tests that will be used to select modules and integrate them into a functioning whole. 26 
                                                           
25 “But in our search for understanding we must be prepared to dig deep, for the forces that matter are rooted in the 
very nature of things and in the processes used to create them. … Simply put, this book is about the process of design 
and how it affects the structure of the industry” (Baldwin and Clark, 2000, p. 1-2). 
26 Baldwin and Clark (2000) distinguished between the “architecture” of a system (the components of a system and 
what they do) and the “interfaces” of that system (the standards that two or more modules must obey in order to 
work together). Others, for example, MIT’s Engineeering Systems Department Architecture Committee (2004) and 
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In their seminal works on design theory, Herbert Simon (1962, 1969) and Christopher Alexander 
(1964) had argued that modularity—or “near-decomposability” in Simon’s terminology—was a rational 
response, and perhaps the only response, to complexity that otherwise threatened to overwhelm the 
minds of designers. Yet as a matter of historical fact, Baldwin and Clark showed that designs cannot 
always be modularized with good results. For example, the first computers had extremely integral 
architectures. Knowledge about computers—their functional components and ways of making them—
had to reach a certain threshold before modularizing the products or processes could be considered.27 The 
architects of a modular system had to know which interactions could be suppressed or constrained 
without compromising the whole.  
IBM System/360, designed between 1961 and 1966, was the first computer system to have a 
“truly modular” architecture. The decision to use this type of architecture was dictated by the growing 
complexity of IBM’s product lines and, especially, by the high cost to customers of reprogramming after 
each equipment upgrade. As envisioned by IBM’s top managers and engineers, a modular product line 
would permit IBM customers to seamlessly upgrade their IT systems as their needs grew or as new and 
better machines became available.  
But creating a modular product line and the necessary supporting manufacturing processes was 
no easy task. IBM found—as would others—that the use of a modular architecture radically altered the 
nature of the design process and the organization of a firm. What had been one stage of product 
development became three: 
(1) Definition of the design rules: this is the information that will be visible to the designers of 
the various modules; 
(2) Work on the “hidden” modules, with each team being able to work independently as long as 
the design rules are obeyed; 
(3) Integration and testing of the system. 
 
And what used to be one object of design and production became many separate objects (Figure 3). 
 
                                                                                                                                                                                              
Fixson (2005), have included interfaces in their definitions of the architecture of a system. 
27 This point was often overlooked in discussions of modularity.  
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Figure 3: The three stages of a modular design process 
 
Source : Baldwin and Clark, 2000 (p. 74). 
 
In fact, as it made the transition from several integral product lines to one modular product line, 
IBM floundered and nearly failed at several junctures. In the end, the company succeeded only because of 
heroic interventions by key managers and engineers. (See Baldwin and Clark, 2000, Chapter 7, for 
details.) Thus the history of System/360 served to reconfirm Clark’s deep-seated belief that “management 
matters.”  
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5.3 The Consequences of Modularity 
 
After defining modular structures and documenting how such systems emerged in the computer 
industry, Baldwin and Clark went on to make the following arguments:  
(1) Modularization increases the value of a design; and  
(2) A modular design can evolve in ways that an integral design cannot. 
 
Modularity affects value, they said, because designs are options. In finance, as mentioned earlier, 
an option is “the right but not the obligation” to take a particular action. A designer or a user does not 
have to accept a new design, but can fall back on an older one. Thus all designs are options. The 
modularization of an integral design in turn multiplies options, creating “at least as many options as 
there are modules.”  
Baldwin and Clark used mathematical models adapted from finance to show that modularity can 
have large effects on the option value of a system. For example, in one thought experiment, they showed 
that going from a one to twenty-five modules (approximately what System/360 did relative to prior 
designs) could increase the value of a system by twenty-five times. Such an increase in turn would pay 
for a lot of experimentation and new entry! 
At the same time, modularization radically changed the organization of work. Once a design has 
been modularized, it is possible to substitute one component for another, to eliminate certain elements, 
and to add new components.  Bringing John Holland’s (1975, 1995) theory of complex adaptive systems 
to bear on designs, Baldwin and Clark defined six modular operators (Table 5). These are “moves” that 
designers can make that will change the design in various ways.  
 
Table 5: Modular operators 
 
Modular operators form a repertory of actions that can be performed  in modular systems. Complex 
changes in a modular system can be represented as combinations of operators. The value of specific 
operator-moves can be modeled using real options methods from finance. 
 
Operator Definition 
Splitting Divides an interdependent system into modules 
Substituting Replaces one module with another 
Augmenting Adds a new module to the system 
Excluding Takes a module out of the system 
Inverting Creates new design rules and architectural modules              
Porting Makes a module compatible with two or more systems 
 
Source : Baldwin and Clark (2003) 
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Importantly, the modular operators were local: by adhering to the design rules, innovators could 
work independently and focus on changing parts of the system without having to redesign the whole. 
Baldwin and Clark argued that this aspect of modularity contributed in important ways to the vertical 
disintegration of the computer industry.28 Historically, the process of vertical disintegration began 
immediately after IBM’s launch of the System/360. The design rules that allowed components to work 
together within System/360 were known to a large number of IBM engineers, many of whom left IBM to 
work for other companies. The companies hiring these engineers used the engineers’ knowledge to 
develop their own products that were “plug-compatible” with System/360, hence could operate in that 
system’s environment. (There was, of course, a great deal of litigation—see Ferguson and Morris, 1993, 
for an overview.)  
What followed was a “balkanization” of the computer industry: a process of fragmentation that 
began in the 1970s and intensified after the introduction of the PC. (By the time the PC was introduced, 
essentially all computer systems had modular designs.)  
Ironically, Design Rules: The Power of Modularity was not the book Baldwin and Clark set out to 
write. It explained structure, dynamics and value at the level of artifacts, designs, and processes, but it 
did not address strategy, that is, how firms might use their understanding of structure, dynamics and 
value to compete. However, in the mid 1990s, Baldwin and Clark faced a quandary. Clark became Dean 
of Harvard Business School in 1995 and did not have as much time as before to spend on research. At the 
same time, as the Internet boom was accelerating, there was more to explain. Indeed, in the late 1990s, it 
seemed that each new day brought new designs, new firms, and new institutions into the game. In 
response (some would say desperation), Baldwin and Clark decided to split Design Rules into two 
volumes.29 Volume 1 would deal with the basics—structure, dynamics and value—and would make the 
case that modular architectures and modular innovations were important (hence “The Power of 
Modularity”). Strategy would be left for Volume 2.  
                                                           
28 Technically speaking, Baldwin and Clark pointed out that the vertically disintegrated industry structure was only 
one possible configuration among many. For example, it was entirely possible to have modular designs within a 
monopoly (Baldwin and Clark, 2000; Chapters 14 and 15). Understanding which industry structures will emerge “on 
top of” a modular architecture requires models of value to be combined with models of strategy. 
29 They were advised to do so by their friend and editor, Barbara Feinberg. 
 
FROM MANUFACTURING TO DESIGN …  MARCH 16, 2007 
  
37 
6 Building on Design Rules 
 
Kim Clark retired from active research in 2005 when he became President of Brigham Young 
University—Idaho. However even today, in 2007, much of his later work is still in the pipeline. In this 
section, we describe three papers that are representative of his later works and demonstrate the 
fruitfulness of a design theoretic framework. 
 
6.1 Modularity and User Innovation 
 
The open source development process  for software, which emerged in conjunction with the 
Internet in the mid-1990s, took Clark and many of his colleagues by surprise. Clark had been an early 
proponent of integrating users into a firm’s product development process (see above), but nothing in his 
prior experience led him to think that users might initiate and manage a product development process for 
themselves. Yet that was exactly what happened in open source development projects. And the largest of 
these projects—Linux and Apache, for example—were capable of supplying software that was fully 
competitive with proprietary products in terms of cost, quality, reliability and, yes, innovation! 
Nevertheless, just as Clark had brought a toolkit from economics to the analysis of 
manufacturing,  Design Rules provided a toolkit for analyzing the structure and value of designs and 
predicting their evolution. Baldwin and Clark reasoned that, if the toolkit was any good, it should be able 
to shed light on the open source phenomenon. In particular, was open source development an 
economically superior way of organizing certain innovation processes, as its adherents claimed? And if 
so, which processes would most benefit from this method of organization? 
 “The Architecture of Participation” was Baldwin and Clark’s attempt to answer these questions 
(Baldwin and Clark, 2006a). It was also their first foray into the second phase of their research plan, which 
aimed to look the economic institutions needed to support design evolution. Taking their lead from 
Masahiko Aoki (2001), an eminent theorist in the field of new institutional economics, Baldwin and Clark 
sought to model open source development as a game among user-innovators, a game that would be 
played “on top of” designs with different architectures. 
Their analysis showed that there was a high degree of complementarity between users’ 
participation in a collective development process and the architecture of the underlying system. 
Specifically, systems with more modular architectures, more divisible task structures, and/or more 
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option value in the modules would attract more voluntary effort. Thus, Baldwin and Clark concluded, a 
user-driven innovation process based on the free revealing and sharing of designs was a viable 
institutional form. Open source development was a sustainable “institution of innovation,” — one that 
was competitive with, and in some cases might dominate, proprietary product development processes. 
 
6.2 Modularity and the Theory of the Firm 
 
One of the things that was evident from the history of the computer industry was that new 
modular architectures not only promoted design evolution, but also permitted the boundaries of firms to 
be redrawn. Indeed, in the 1990s it was commonly believed that modular product architectures gave rise 
to modular organizations, which in turn gave rise to clusters of firms (Langlois and Robertson, 1992; 
Sanchez and Mahoney, 1996;  Schilling, 2000). However, before the seminal work of Jacobides, the 
mechanisms by which firm boundaries changed were not well understood (Jacobides, 2005; Cacciatori 
and Jacobides, 2005; Jacobides and Billinger, 2006). Jacobides’ work in turn raised questions about how 
firm boundaries were influenced by the underlying product and process architectures.  
A desire to relate the modular structure of products and processes to the boundaries of firms 
prompted Baldwin and Clark (2006d) to take a fresh look at transactions. In the modern economic theory 
of the firm, as formulated by Oliver Williamson (1975, 1985) and Sanford Grossman, Oliver Hart and John 
Moore (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990; Hart, 1995), transactions were always located at 
what Williamson (1985) called “technologically separable interfaces,” ie, places where a technological 
division of work and knowledge already existed. 30 But, Baldwin and Clark reasoned, such interfaces 
were part of the design of a product and its production process. Thus what Williamson and other 
transaction-cost and property-rights economists took to be exogenous places in a system of production, 
were in fact endogenous. Technologically separable interfaces were the result of designers’ intent 
interacting with the physical and logical constraints of products and production processes. In other 
words, transactions arose in specific locations because designers created technologically separable 
                                                           
30 More specifically, Williamson (1985, Chapter 4) asserted that the adoption of a particular form of transaction  
resulted from choices made by those involved. He emphasized, however, that the technological aspect is only very 
rarely a deciding factor in this decision  “[T]echnological separability… is a widespread condition, … the rule rather 
than the exception. It thus becomes easy and even natural to regard the transaction as the basic unit of analysis” (p. 
87). Thus Williamson focused on different ways of organizing and governing transactions, not on their origin. (Our 
thanks to D. Chabaud for sharing with us his insights on this aspect of Williamson’s thinking.) 
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interfaces that made transactions cost-effective at those points. 
Baldwin and Clark then used design theory to analyze the location of technologically separable 
interfaces (hence transactions) in a system of production. They argued that, because humans are 
physically and cognitively bounded, transfers between people are needed in all but the smallest 
productive systems. Thus any productive system can be viewed as a network of tasks (nodes) and 
transfers (links).  
However, not all transfers in a given network can be the basis of transactions. For a transfer (or 
set of transfers) to become a transaction, Baldwin and Clark said, three conditions must be met:  
(1) The object(s) transferred must be standardized, implying that there is an understanding and 
a common definition shared by two (or more) parties. 
(2) The object(s) must be counted by means of units (of weight, volume etc.). 
(3) The transfer must be compensated, most often in the form of money, implying the existence 
of a system of valuation and payment in society. 
 
These three activities in turn are costly, which meant that transactions are more costly than simple 
transfers.  
Baldwin and Clark called the costs of standardizing, counting, valuing and paying for goods 
“mundane transaction costs,” to distinguish them from the “opportunistic transaction costs,” which were 
the focus of most economic analyses of the time.31 Opportunistic transaction costs arose from the fact that 
humans display what Williamson called “self-interest seeking with guile” (Williamson, 1985, p. 47). 
Examples of opportunistic transaction costs included an employee’s tendency to shirk; the probability 
that a supplier would provide inferior goods; and the cost of litigation. In some cases mundane 
transaction costs might be used to reduce opportunisitic transaction costs, but the two types of cost were 
conceptually distinct.  
Baldwin and Clark then argued that mundane transaction costs were lowest at the “thin crossing 
points” of a network of production: the places where two parts of the system were nearly independent. 
Thin crossing points in turn arose at the boundaries of modules or near-modules.32 In effect, then, module 
boundaries and technologically separable interfaces were the same thing. Also when a system was modularized, 
the number of thin crossing points was multiplied as a consequence of the design change. Therefore the 
                                                           
31 The name “mundane transaction cost” was chosen to be parallel with Williamson’s idea of “mundane vertical 
integration” which, he said, occurred between closely linked stages of production (Williamson, 1985, p. 105). 
32 The minimum interaction zones located between the blocks of the matrix in Figure 3 p. 40. 
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technological act of modularizing a system would necessarily reduce mundane transaction costs at a 
number of locations in the system. This was why a new modular architecture—such as IBM’s architecture 
for System/360— made it feasible to redraw the boundaries of firms and multiply the number of firms 
participating in an industry. 
In addition to relating modular structure to the transaction costs and property rights theories of 
the firm, the “Transactions” paper shed light on the knowledge- or capabilities-based view of firms as 
well (Kogut and Zander, 1992, 1996;  Nonaka and Takeuchi, 1995; Conner and Prahalad, 1996). Baldwin 
and Clark argued that a firm is “a social artifact designed for the purpose of encapsulating complex 
transfers of material, energy and information” (p. 25). In other words, firms were designed to carry out 
transfers that could not become (cost-effective) transactions because their implicit mundane transaction 
costs were too high. Tranfers of knowledge often have high implicit mundane transaction costs, and thus 
firms were structures (“social artifacts”) where time-sensitive, specific knowledge could be developed, 
stored and moved around as needed.33  
Thus according to Baldwin and Clark, firms were, at one and the same time, entities that 
economized on transaction costs (as seen by economists) and entities that built, stored and used 
knowledge (as seen by management scholars). Linking these two apects of the nature of firms was the 
design principle “information hiding,” proposed by the design theorist, David Parnas (1972, 1979). Parnas 
contended that each (properly defined) module:  
(1) should have interfaces visible to the outsiders who need to use the module; and  
(2) should also hide information about how the module actually does its job.  
 
The visible interfaces of firms were their transactions (with customers, employees and suppliers). The 
hidden information of firms encompassed their internal processes, problem-solving methods, and routines. 
In this fashion, the theory of modular designs could be used to enhance the basic contributions of Kogut 
and Zander (1992, 1996), Nonaka and Takeuchi (1995) and Conner and Prahalad (1996) on the nature of 
firms. 
 
                                                           
33 However, Baldwin and Clark (2006d) does not contemplate organizational configurations in which various 
companies can collaborate on matters where the knowledge level is too low for transactions to occur immediately. 
Yet certain literature, particularly French work, on the organization of the design process has shown that such 
organizational arrangements are possible and beneficial for both companies. (With regard to co-development, see for 
example Kesseler, 1998; Garel and Midler, 1998). 
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6.3 The Strategic Use of Architectural Knowledge 
 
Clark’s work in the 1980s and early 1990s focused almost exclusively on the failure of established 
firms. From this perspective, architectural innovations were exogenous events caused by “shocks” in 
technology and demand. Thus Clark and his coauthors never addressed the question, what caused the 
shocks? Nevertheless, Henderson and Clark (1990) ended their paper on a provocative note, hinting at a 
shift from defense to offense: 
Since architectural innovation has the potential to offer firms the opportunity to gain significant 
advantage over well-entrenched, dominant firms, we might expect less-entrenched competitor 
firms to search actively for opportunities to introduce changes in product architecture… . 
(Henderson and Clark, p. 28). 
 
Recently two papers have appeared that suggest how architectural knowledge might be used—
proactively—to change the structure of an industry. Interestingly, the papers describe very different 
strategies. Because they point in such different directions, we feel it would be misleading to describe one 
and not the other. 
Baldwin and Clark’s (2006e) paper was  based on the principles of “third generation” computer 
architecture as set forth in two textbooks by John Hennessy and David Patterson (1990, 1994).34 According 
to Hennessy and Patterson, architectural knowledge consists of detailed, quantitative knowledge about 
the cause-and-effect relationships that constrain product (or process) performance. Given such 
knowledge, an architect can determine (1) where bottlenecks arise in a given system; (2) how to remedy a 
bottleneck; and (3) how to modularize a system, that is, how to separate components and encapsulate them 
behind well-defined interfaces.  
Baldwin and Clark went on to argue that, with such knowledge in hand, the architect’s firm can 
seek to control the bottleneck, and, at the same time, can outsource non-bottleneck components and 
subsystems. The result is a smaller “footprint”, ie, the architect’s firm does less inhouse. The smaller 
footprint in turn translates into a superior return on invested capital, which (the paper showed) allows 
                                                           
34 The first generation of computer architectures were based on a memorandum by John von Neumann (Baldwin and 
Clark, 2000, Chapter 6). The second generation involved modular architectures. These were initiated by System/360, 
and their design principles were set forth by Bell and Newell (1971). The third generation of architectures applied 
quantitative metrics to modular hardware and software designs and used these to develop reduced instruction set 
computer (RISC) architectures. (Hennessy and Patterson, 1990, 1994). Many successful computer designs of the 1980s 
and 1990s, including Berkeley Unix and its descendants, Sun Microsystems’ and SiliconGraphics’ workstations, and 
Cisco’s routers were based on third-generation principles. Hennessy and Patterson’s work was anticipated by John 
Cocke at IBM (Hennesy and Patterson, 1990, pp. 130, 189; Ferguson and Morris, 1993, pp. 38-42).  
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the firm to drive competitors out of the market. Baldwin and Clark presented evidence that Sun 
Microsystems (in the late 1980s) and Dell Computer (in the 1990s) competed in just this way. 
Fixson and Park (2007) described the evolution of the bicycle drive train industry. Interestingly, 
as was the case in Henderson’s and Clark’s photolithographic equipment industry, the critical 
architectural knowledge in bike drive trains had to do with the alignment of subsystems. If five of the six 
components in a drive train were aligned just so, the system would support “index shifting,” that is, the 
rider could shift gears without taking his hand off the handlebars. Index shifting turned out to be a very 
attractive feature for cyclists: so much so that, once it became available, almost all customers demanded 
it. However, for the essentially same reasons Henderson and Clark described in photolithographic 
equipment, the capabilities needed to produce a properly aligned drive train were hard to imitate. Thus, 
within five years of the introduction of the index-shifting drive train, the industry went from being a 
fragmented, vertically distintegrated cluster to a highly concentrated, vertically integrated oligopoly. 
Shimano, the first company to introduce the new drive trains, became the dominant firm, going from 
around 15% to 57% of the road bike market and from 45% to 78% of the mountain bike market. Such is 
the power of strategic architectural innovation! 
 
7 Conclusion 
 
This paper has reviewed the research contributions of Kim Clark over almost 30 years (1978-
2007). Clark is an interesting figure to study not only because of his own contributions, but also because 
he was at the center of the TOM group at Harvard Business School for almost two decades. There he was 
strongly influenced by his senior colleagues and contemporaries, including Hayes, Abernathy, 
Wheelwright, Rosenbloom, Bower, Lawrence, Jaikumar and Bowen. And he in turn influenced his 
students and junior colleagues, including Chew, Fujimoto, Leonard-Barton, Henderson, Christensen, 
Iansiti, David Ellison, and Steven Spear.  
His intellectual trajectory also mirrored a fundamental change in the basis of global competition. 
Over the period spanned by his career, firms increasingly have come to compete on the basis of their 
product development performance, innovation and, more generally, design activities. Clark’s work sheds 
light on the underlying causes of this paradigm shift. 
Looking at Clark’s life’s work, a number of themes stand out. Methodologically, Clark was 
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committed to field research and especially to the analysis of measurable constructs. He liked simple 
statistics and delighted in constructing indices. He did not mind small samples, but liked to be sure that 
“all important examples” were included in his research plan. The auto industry study with Chew and 
Fujimoto was an example of his preferred style of empirical research. 
Theory building was also an important part of Clark’s methodology. He persistently sought to 
interpret field data in terms of overarching frameworks and models, which he developed himself or with his 
coauthors. In constructing his theories, he was highly eclectic, wandering far away from management and 
his home discipline, economics. Clark’s theorizing was initially nurtured by Abernathy, who gave him 
enough ideas to last a lifetime. After Abernathy’s death, Clark continued to pursue Abernathy’s question, 
why do established firms fail? And later, in Design Rules, he formalized Abernathy’s ideas about design 
hierarchies and design evolution. Thus Abernathy’s vision pervades much of Clark’s work. 
In addition to his methodological preferences for field research and theory building, Clark 
brought two substantive convictions to all his work. The first was “management matters.” Academically 
speaking, this conviction was sometimes a strength and sometimes a weakness. On the one hand, Clark 
and his colleagues were able to show exactly how much management mattered in two important arenas: 
manufacturing and product development. Their work contributed to a better understanding of the role of 
management and managers who, as noted by David Teece (2006), are generally banished from economic 
theory. However, Clark also had a tendency to interpret all events in terms of managerial interventions 
by key players. He never encountered a situation in which he felt managers had no latitude for action and 
could not—somehow—influence events.  
Clark’s second strong conviction was that the key to understanding technical change lay in 
understanding the “deep structure” of products and processes. This close-up view of technology led to 
some notable successes: Dynamic Manufacturing, the auto industry study, the evidence from the 
photolithographic equipment industry. But his focus on deep structure also sometimes led Clark to over-
generalize based on small and non-representative samples. For example, “the failure of established firms” 
was not the biggest story in the U.S. economy in the 1980s and 1990s. A larger story was the economy’s 
striking ability to generate and fund innovations, and the potential for the capital markets to overshoot. 
Clark, like many others, was blind-sided by the Internet bubble and crash (Baldwin and Clark, 2003). 
Notwithstanding a few blind spots, on the whole, Clark’s convictions served him well. They 
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caused him to look at the world in new way—to see things not noticed by most other scholars. And his 
convictions, deeply felt as they were, nevertheless gave him plenty of room for intellectual growth. Over 
the course of his career, he moved from manufacturing to product development to design: each time he 
used insights gained from prior work to inform his next endeavor. For example, Design Rules, his last 
major work, made little use of field research or statistical analysis, but it was based on the direct 
observation of design structures and it developed new tools to measure design value. Thus even as his 
focus changed, Clark’s fundamental approaches remained the same. 
In sum, throughout his career, Clark brought fresh new insights to old questions and opened up 
new territories of research. He helped to replace Taylor’s scientific management principles with the 
dynamic concepts of continual learning and learning organizations. He showed how product 
development could be actively managed for greater efficiency and effectiveness. He developed a theory 
of the embedding of knowledge in organizations, which he used to explain why established firms often 
fail in the face of “seemingly minor innovations.” He showed how changes in the modular structure of 
products and processes could bring about fundamental change in the structure of industries. And finally, 
in his later works, he built bridges from design theory to user innovation, transaction- and knowledge-
based theories of the firm, and strategy.  
In light of these contributions, Clark’s intellectual legacy seems secure. 
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Appendix A: Chronological List of Clark’s Publications 
Works by Kim Clark are listed in the following order: (1) by year; (2) Clark sole-authored; (3) Clark first 
author, alphabetically by author; (4) Clark second or third author, alphabetically by author. The list 
excludes cases and casebooks and all but the most significant working papers. 
 
1980 
 
Clark, K. B. (1980) “The impact of unionization on productivity : a case study,” Industrial and Labor 
Relations Review, vol. 33(4): 451-469. 
 
Clark, K. B. (1980) “Unionization and Productivity: Micro-Econometric Evidence,” Quarterly Journal of 
Economics vol. 94(4): 613-639. 
 
Clark, K. B. and Freeman, R. B. (1980) “How Elastic is the Demand for Labor?” The Review of Economics 
and Statistics, 62(4): 509-520. 
 
1981 
 
Clark, K. B. and Summers, L. H.  (1981) “Demographic Differences in Cyclical Employment Variation,” 
The Journal of Human Resources, 16(1): 61-79. 
  
Abernathy W. J., Clark, K. B. & Kantrow, A. M. (1981) “The new industrial competition,” Harvard Business 
Review, September-October: 68-81. 
  
1982 
 
Clark, K. B. and Summers, L. H. (1982) “Labour force participation: timing and persistence,” Review of 
Economic Studies, 49(4): 825-844. 
 
1983 
 
Clark, K. B. (1983), “Competition, technical diversity and radical innovation in the US auto industry,” in 
Research on Technological Innovation, Management and Policy, Volume 1 (Rosenbloom, R. S., ed.), 
Greenwich, CT: JAI Press.  
 
Abernathy, W. J., Clark, K. B. & Kantrow, A. M. (1983), Industrial renaissance. Producing a competitive future 
for America, New York: Basic Books.  
 
1984 
 
Clark, K. B. (1984), “Unionization and firm performance: the impact on profits, growth and productivity,” 
American Economic Review, 74(5): 893-919. 
 
1985 
 
Clark, K. B. (1985), “The interaction of design hierarchies and market concepts in technological 
evolution,” Research Policy, 14(5): 235-251. 
 
Clark, K. B., Hayes R. H. and Lorenz C., eds. (1985), The Uneasy alliance: Managing the productivity – 
technology dilemma. Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. 
 
Abernathy, W. J. and Clark, K. B. (1985), “Innovation: mapping the winds of creative destruction,” 
Research Policy, 14(1): 3-22. 
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Hayes R. H. and Clark K. B. (1985) “Exploring the sources of productivity differences at the factory level” 
in The Uneasy Alliance: Managing the productivity – technology dilemma (Clark, K. B., Hayes R. H. 
and Lorenz C., eds.) Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. 
 
Hayes, R. H. and Clark, K.B. (1985) “Explaining productivity differentials between plants : implications 
for operations research,” Interfaces, 15(6): 3 –14. 
 
1986 
 
Clark, K. B. and Rothman, E. (1986) “Management and Innovation: The Evolution of Ceramic Packaging 
for Integrated Circuits,” in High-Technology Ceramics: Past, Present and Future (Kingery, W. D., 
ed.) American Ceramic Society. 
 
Hayes, R. H. and Clark, K. B. (1986), “Why some factories are more productive than others?” Harvard 
Business Review, September-October: 66-74. 
 
1987 
 
Clark, K. B. (1987) “Investment in New Technology and Competitive Advantage,” in The Competitive 
Challenge (Teece, D. J., ed.) Cambridge, MA: Ballinger Publishing Company. 
 
Clark, K. B., Chew, W. B. and Fujimoto, T. (1987), “Product development in the world auto industry,” 
Brookings Papers on Economic Activity, 3: 729-771. 
 
Clark, K. B. and Fujimoto, T. (1987) “Overlapping Problem Solving in Product Development,” Managing 
International Manufacturing (Ferdows, K., ed.) Amsterdam: North-Holland. 
 
1988 
 
Clark, K. B. (1988) “Managing technology in international competition: the case of product development 
in response to foreign entry,” in International Competitiveness (Spence, A. M. & Hazard, H. eds.) 
Ballinger Publishing Company, Cambridge, MA. 
 
Clark, K. B. (undated, probably 1988) “Knowledge, Problem Solving, and Innovation in the Evolutionary 
Firm: Implications for Mangerial Capability and Competitive Interaction,” Working paper, 
Harvard Business School, Boston, MA. 
 
Clark, K. B. and Fujimoto, T. (1988) “Lead Time in Automobile Product Development: Explaining the 
Japanese Advantage,” Journal of Engineering and Technology Management, 6: 25-58. 
 
Clark, K. B. & Hayes, R. H. (1988) “Recapturing America’s manufacturing heritage,” California 
Management Review, 30(4): 9-33. 
 
Hayes, R. H., Wheelwright, S. C. and Clark, K. B. (1988) Dynamic manufacturing. Creating the learning 
organization, The Free Press, New York. 
 
1989 
 
Clark, K. B. (1989) “Project scope and project performance: the effect of parts strategy and supplier 
involvement on product development,” Management Science, 35(10): 1247-1263. 
 
Clark, K. B. (1989) “What Strategy Can Do for Technology,” Harvard Business Review, November-
December: 94-98. 
 
Clark, K. B. and Fujimoto, T. (1989) “Reducing time to market: the case of the world auto industry,” 
Design Management Journal, 1(1): 49-57. 
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Henderson, R. M. & Clark, K. (1989) “’Generational’ innovation: the reconfiguration of existing systems 
and the failure of established firms,” Working paper 90-025, Harvard Business School. 
 
1990 
 
Clark, K. B. and Fujimoto, T. (1990) “The power of product integrity,” Harvard Business Review, 
November-December: 107-118. 
 
Chew, W. B., K. B. Clark and T. Bresnahan (1990) “Measurement, Coordination and Learning in a Multi-
Plant Network,” in Measures for Manufacturing Excellence, Volume 2, Accounting and Control Series 
(Kaplan, R.S., ed.) Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. 
 
Henderson, R. M. & Clark, K. B. (1990) “Architectural innovation: the reconfiguration of existing product 
technologies and the failure of established firms,” Administrative Science Quarterly, 35: 9-30. 
 
1991 
 
Clark, K. B. (1991) “High Performance Product Development in the World Auto Industry,” International 
Journal of Vehicle Design 12(2): 105-131. 
 
Clark, K. B. & Fujimoto, T. (1991) Product development performance. Strategy, organization and management in 
the world auto industry, Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. 
 
Adler, P. S. and Clark, K. B. (1991), “Behind the learning curve: a sketch of the learning process,” 
Management Science, 37(3): 267-281. 
 
1992 
 
Clark, K. B. and Wheelwright, S. C. (1992), “Organizing and leading heavyweight development teams », 
California Management Review, 34(3): 9-28.  
 
Baldwin, C. Y. and Clark, K. B. (1992a), “Capabilities and Capital Investment: New Perspectives on 
Capital Budgeting,” Journal of Applied Corporate Finance, 5(2): 67-82. 
 
Baldwin, C. Y. and Clark, K. B. (1992b) “Modularity and Real Options: An Exploratory Analysis” 
Working Paper 93-026, Harvard Business School, October. 
 
Chew, W. B., Clark, K. B., and Fujimoto, T.  (1992) “Manufacturing for Design: Beyond the Product/R&D 
Dichotomy,” in Integrating Design and Manufacturing for Competitive Advantage (Susman, G. I., ed.) 
New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Wheelwright, S. C. and Clark, K. B. (1992a), Revolutionizing product development. Quantum leaps in speed, 
efficiency and quality. New York: The Free Press. Second edition with additional case studies in 
1993. Title : Managing new product and process development. 
 
Wheelwright, S. C. and Clark, K. B. (1992b), “Creating project plan to focus product development,” 
Harvard Business Review, March-April: 70-82. 
 
Wheelwright, S. C. and Clark, K. B. (1992c) “Competing through Development Capability in a 
Manufacturing-based Organization,” Business Horizons 35(4): 29-43. 
 
1994 
 
Clark, K. B. and Fujimoto, T.  (1994) “The Product Development Imperative: Competing in the New 
Industrial Marathon,” The Relevance of a Decade: Essays to Mark the First Ten Years of the Harvard 
Business School Press, (Duffy, P., ed.) Boston, MA: Harvard Business School Press. 
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Clark, K. B., Iansiti, M. and Billington, R. (1994) “Project Leadership and Organization,” in The perpetual 
enterprise machine: seven keys to corporate renewal through successful product and process development, 
1994, (Bowen, K., Clark, K., Holloway, C. and Wheelwright, S., eds.) New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
 
Baldwin, C. Y. and Clark, K. B. (1994), “Capital-budgeting systems and capabilities investments in U.S. 
companies after the second world war,” Business History Review, 68(1): 73-109. 
 
Bowen, H. K., Clark, K. B., Holloway, C. A., and Wheelwright, S. C. (1994) “Development Projects: The 
Engine of Renewal,” Harvard Business Review, 72(5):110-120. Also in The perpetual enterprise 
machine: seven keys to corporate renewal through successful product and process development, 1994, 
(Bowen, K., Clark, K., Holloway, C. & Wheelwright, S., eds.) New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Bowen, H. K., Clark, K. B., Holloway, C. A., and Wheelwright, S. C. (1994) “Make Projects the School for 
Leaders,” Harvard Business Review, 72(5):131-140. Also in The perpetual enterprise machine: seven keys 
to corporate renewal through successful product and process development, 1994, (Bowen, K., Clark, K., 
Holloway, C. & Wheelwright, S., eds.) New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
Iansiti, M. & Clark, K. B. (1994) “Integration and dynamic capabilities: evidence from product 
development in automobiles and mainframe computers,” Industrial and corporate change, 3(3): 557-
605. 
 
Leonard-Barton, D., Bowen, H. K., Clark, K. B., Holloway, C. A., and Wheelwright, S. C. (1994) “How to 
Integrate Work and Deepen Experise,” Harvard Business Review, 72(5):121-130. Also in The 
perpetual enterprise machine: seven keys to corporate renewal through successful product and process 
development, 1994, (Bowen, K., Clark, K., Holloway, C. & Wheelwright, S., eds.) New York: Oxford 
University Press. 
  
Wheelwright, S. C. and K. B. Clark (1994) “Accelerating the Design-Build-Test Cycle for Effective Product 
Development, International Marketing Review 11(1):32-46. 
 
1995 
 
Wheelwright, S. C. and Clark, K. B. (1995) Leading Product Development: The Senior Managers Guide to 
Creating and Shaping the Enterprise, New York: Free Press. 
 
Ellison, D. J., Clark, K. B., Fujimoto, T. and Hyun Y. (1995) “Product Development Performance in the 
Auto Industry: 1990s Update,” Working paper #w-0060a, International Motor Vehicle Program, 
available online at http://imvp.mit.edu/pub95.html . 
 
1996 
 
Clark, K. B. (1996) “Competing through manufacturing and the new manufacturing paradigm: is 
manufacturing strategy passé?” Production and Operations Management, 5(1): 42-58. 
 
Fujimoto, T., Iansiti, M. and Clark, K. B. (1996) “External Integration in Product Development,” Managing 
Product Development (Nishigusi, T., ed.) New York: Oxford University Press. 
 
1997 
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Organizations, 2003 (Garud, R., Kumaraswamy, A. , Langlois, R. N., eds.) Malden, MA: Blackwell 
Publishing. 
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